Skopje, 3 August 2026 (MIA)

Slobodan IVANOV

“The uprising is a powerful means of the Organization but only while it is an idea we strive for. I was convinced that if it became “reality” disappointment would emerge right after the uprising. It turned out to be true. Delchev and I wanted to reveal this program inside (in Macedonia) and we didn’t believe that “the Garvans” would succeed. But when Garvanov, when he arrived here, together with Matov, Tatarchev and their supporters, they consulted secretly without us and sent a counter-letter, signed by Matov and Tatarchev, posing as an opinion by everyone here, with the exception of some. They didn’t say anything about our letter in Thessaloniki and moved on with them agitating. They had planned the uprising to begin in early spring, then on Gjurgjovden, continuing on saints Cyril and Methodius Day. In the end, at the Smilevo Congress, they decided on July 20 – Ilinden. They had already divided the country into military divisions for the needs of the uprising. Gruev had already approved everything and he had already known about Garvanov and Dumev arriving. The main commanders of the fighting divisions had been already picked in a draft,” writes Gjorche Petrov in his “Memoirs” about the Ilinden Uprising and the infighting in VMRO having its “pros” and “cons” about an uprising.

Gjorche was one of the many Macedonian revolutionaries who, sharing the position of Goce Delchev, in 1903 were against a mass uprising at that moment, and in favor of a partisan method of action, contrary to the positions of most of the then Central Committee, led by Ivan Garvanov, as well as Hristo Matov and Hristo Tatarchev - the leaders of the Foreign Representation of TMORO, who were on the same line as Garvanov. The spears of the Thessaloniki Congress (January 15 - 17, new style) and the Sofia Council clashed over the idea of ​​a general and comprehensive uprising on the one hand, and on the other - the idea of ​​gradually building resistance against the government through individual, but frequent armed attacks and undertakings of various kinds.

In this context, writing about events in January and February 1903, Gjorche Petrov in his “Memoirs” argues that the Organization and the population were ill-prepared for the Ilinden Uprising. According to him, right after the Council – convened by Matov and Tatarchev, in which Gjorche had delivered a six-hour speech against a general uprising, Garvanov and Velko Dumev had arrived there in order to persuade them. Delchev remained firm against the uprising, whereas Pere Toshev had avoided giving his approval, in fact he was declared himself in abstention insisting he didn’t “have enough insight” on the matter, writes the historian Vancho Gjorgiev in “Underground Republic”.

Gjorche believed that instead of a general uprising being raised, actions should have been taken gradually from passive to more active fighting. He had proposed that units and city organizations should have been given more freedom for nearby actions against the Ottoman authorities allowing the fighters to get enough experience and the population would have been prepared for a future major battle. According to him, this type of long-lasting and enhancing fight would have worked better than an early general uprising.

Despite these arguments, the Central Committee continued its preparations for the uprising.

“It was decided at the Smilevo Congress (May 2-7, 1903) that the uprising would begin on Ilinden (July 20 according to the old style, or August 2 according to the new calendar). Previously, Damjan Gruev had returned from captivity shortly before Easter, and in Thessaloniki he learned that the decision to revolt had been made and could not be changed - all that remained was to determine the date. He then participated in the Smilevo Congress. 

"At the Congress I presented the situation as it was - I considered it foolish to keep quiet that some regions were not at all ready, and that they would not take part. I met (Boris) Sarafov for the first time in Smilevo at my home. At the Congress Sarafov was categorically in favor of action. He had an opinion that the uprising should begin earlier. We did not believe that the Turks would decide to resort to such cruelty - to completely annihilate the population. Sarafov said in confidence that a minister had said that if we were able to keep 60,000 Turkish troops, Bulgaria would get involved. And I finally admitted that it could come to that. The Congress elected me a member of the General Staff of the Bitola Vilayet, together with Sarafov and (Anastas) Lozanchev,” says Dame in his “Memoirs”. 

Petrov says that Delchev, disappointed with the developments and the relations of the leaders, in the midst of the Congress departed for the Serres revolutionary district hoping he might make an influence. However, he was killed there, in Banica. Gjorche assumed that Delchev’s whereabouts were undisclosed through a Thessaloniki-linked espionage network, i.e. with Garvanov’s Central Committee. Previously, Goce had met with Dame in Thessaloniki.

“Delchev had departed with a strong desire to see Gruev, to share views with him; he still had hope, but he left worried about the Organization. He arrived in Thessaloniki. They cunningly left him alone with Dame, who kept him in a room with him for 2-3 days and struggled to break his conviction against the uprising. Dame only succeeded in dealing him the final blow of disappointment, as he himself confessed to Pere (Pejo) Javorov and others, whom he later met in Serres. This spirit of despair is also seen in a letter to me, in which he tells me that nothing can be done and that he is going to Serres "to lay down his head". In Thessaloniki, he had been entrusted with the task of convincing his comrades in Serres for an uprising and organizing them there. Delchev ordered the voivodes to be summoned to a congress. Jane Sandanski sent a company to meet him in Serres Region and take him to the mountain,” Gjorche writes.

After Delchev’s death, both Gjorche and Dame concluded the decision on the uprising could no longer be changed. An uprising was inevitable; thus they focused on organizing and arming companies for the upcoming fight. 

MACEDONIA IN UPRISING

A depiction of Macedonia follows during the era of the Ilinden Uprising through the eyes of Gjorche Petrov and Damjan Gruev – a comparison between rebelling hotspots and the locations unaffected by armed clashes.

On Ilinden, Petrov departed for Kyustendil from Sofia, where his company of about 140 men, mostly from the western Macedonian regions, was already waiting for him. Crossing the Bulgarian-Ottoman border was extremely difficult. The Ottoman authorities learned of his movement in advance, and the Bulgarian authorities also received orders to disarm his company. Thanks to the agreement with the border officer and the constant change of direction of movement, the company avoided both Bulgarian and Ottoman ambushes and, after several days of effort, managed to enter Macedonia.

Transiting the regions of Grativo, Kumanovoi and Skopje, Gjorche was cautious in an attempt to avoid clashes with the Turkish army because he mainly aimed at arriving at the Bitola Revolutionary District. He received food and guidance in villages, but he also realized that the people east of Vardar weren’t prepared for an uprising. People expected weapons from Bulgaria and the organization there, he believed, wasn’t strong enough there and mainly served to welcome and send off companies.

Readers may get the impression from Gjorche’s Memoirs that although many companies had passed there, they had failed in building a strong organization and network and in training and arming the population. This had further enhanced his conviction that the uprising was started the wrong way and without a much-needed preparation. 

After many risks, the company successfully crossed the Vardar near Veles. Here Petrov felt that he had entered a better organized revolutionary environment, because the locals welcomed them and helped them without asking for compensation. However, he was disappointed that in the Veles area he did not see a real insurgent movement, but a peaceful situation and - a lack of weapons, although in Western Macedonia the uprising had already been declared. 

Towards the Prilep area, Petrov noticed that the population west of the Vardar showed a different revolutionary spirit, but there he did not find a mass population on alert. In the village of Stepanci he met with Petar Acev's company, where he learned more about the state of the uprising. Instead of the picture he had imagined - a general armed conflict, he saw before him a quiet landscape and a rebellious mood that did not develop as he had expected. 

In the Prilep area, although he did not find a mass uprising, Petrov was encouraged by the fighting spirit and national consciousness of the population. There, for the first time after his long journey, he felt among his own people, met with relatives, and began to think about how to use the forces and material he had brought to organize new actions. Despite his disappointment with the course of the uprising, he still hoped that something could be done in the Prilep region.

"We had a nice meal. There were herds nearby. After a 20-day journey, we had our first good rest... We met Petar Acev's Prilep company, which had set out to meet us. I had many Chetniks with me from Western Macedonia (Debar, Kicevo, Demirhisar). There, everyone separated from me and headed for their hometowns via Azot. I stayed with about 45-46 people and moved with the Prilep company. In Stepanci, I received the first news about the situation in the insurgent region and I understood that things were not as wonderful as I had imagined. I imagined that the line between Prilep and Veles was the border, that to the west there was fog, blood and war. When I left Stepanci, the Prilep field appeared clear and quiet to me. I was glad to see my native region, but on the other hand I was sad because of the disappointment. From Stepanci we left for the village of Orehovec - above Prilep itself, there we had road. We settled in houses, divided into groups, we were welcomed well. In the Prilep region we did not find an insurgent population, but the fighting spirit was quite awakened, there was an advanced consciousness and almost complete fearlessness. People had not yet lost hope that something could be done. I also nourished myself with the hope that we could make an attempt to gather young people - the more active forces in the city. I carried a lot of materials and thought that we could do something in the Prilep region”, says Gjorche. 

In the meantime, before the uprising flared up in the Bitola vilayet, Dame Gruev, Boris Sarafov and Anastas Lozanchev toured the Ohrid, Demirhisar and Kostur regions. When they declared the uprising, the three leaders of the insurgent General Staff were in Smilevo, and the chief of that region was Gjorge Sugarev. The first battle for Smilevo followed.

“We lost the battle. We were in the mountains. We descended, joined the villagers, there were only about 200 of us. The Turks had fortified themselves in the school, which was a stone building, so nothing could be done. The shooting continued all night. During the night, we set fire to a room in which they had a warehouse with cartridges, etc., there were soldiers inside, so some of them burned alive. We tried to blow up the other buildings with dynamite, but we failed. The next day, on July 21, in the afternoon, another soldier arrived to help. We gave the order to withdraw our advance guard in front of the village, the village company that was deployed there had not received that notification. And yet, another company met the company - a dozen Turks and one yusbashi fell, and one of ours - a komita. The company belonged to Stojan Donski, it was the Smilevo company. When the company retreated, the army approached the company that had been in front; this opened fire, killing 2-3 Turks... On the third day, the army entered the village without any obstacles, freed its Turkish comrades and then set fire to 30 houses. All the villagers were dissatisfied with this retreat, which was ordered by the headquarters. When the villagers saw the smoke from the burning houses, they began to approach the village. The Turkish army thought that they would be attacked by them, and fled, leaving behind bags and other things, and the villagers rushed in and put out the fire,” notes Gruev.

Turks came back on August 14 carrying artillery. Nearly 33 komitas had fallen. The companies started retreating and the Turks had already surrounded the village. At night, the rebels broke through the Turkish encirclement in the mountains.

“There was no violence during the surrender. However, on the first day, some women with children, who had just arrived home, were beaten and even raped. The villagers entered the village, which was burned. The army remained on the heights around the village for another three days. We had collected food and clothing in the forest, so that was saved. About 50 families were left completely without clothing. After the capitulation, a large number (about 300 men), with the exception of the armed rebels, returned to Bitola. They did not want to let them into the city, but they finally managed to enter. They settled there, partly in their own houses. Then, during September, we all gathered - Lozanchev and Sarafov, in the village, where the army came again. We went up the mountain; there were 150-160 of us, we took up positions for fighting. We noticed that armies were approaching from two other sides. We concentrated in the center. Fire opened from the wings. The wings retreated. The center, after a few shots, retreated again towards the mountain,” Gruev writes. 

THE UPRISING FAILING

Boris Sarafov at that moment expressed his determination to leave for Bulgaria and headed through the Prespa-Lerin Region. 

"Some of his men and others also left with him. After Sarafov's departure, the general decision to stop the fighting came into effect. We stored about 400 rifles. I went to supervise the other regions, all in the Bitola region. The British aid missions brought some comfort and reassurance. On the other hand, the voices about reforms (in the Ottoman state) encouraged us somewhat”, Gruev recalls. 

During his stay in the Prilep region, Gjorche Petrov also met with Pere Toshev, and together they concluded that the Organization was not ready for a real uprising, although the population still hoped for external help.

“Pere himself described the situation to me, that the whole thing was frivolous, and we stayed there; we walked and wandered around the villages together. The situation was simply hopeless and we did not know what to do. We interpreted the reasons for this and detected them as being with Dame, Lozanchev and others. The boys became discouraged. I tried through Duke Petar Acev to gather a mountain force, which we could raise, so that at least it would look like there was an uprising. But it turned out that the local organization was simply in ruins; it was not known where and how much weapons they had, they could not even arm 70 people. I sent people from my company to the city to investigate whether some kind of action could be carried out in the city; for that purpose, I also forced Duke Petar Acev to enter Prilep and organize some kind of action in the city”, says Gjorce. 

Attempts with Petar Acev to gather a larger rebel force also failed, because the organization there was disintegrated, there were no weapons, and the city leadership, according to Petrov, showed indecision and avoided taking real revolutionary actions. "The leadership in Prilep had fallen into the hands of egotistical people; they were young people from the city. I called everyone. My impression was that the city was not working on a truly revolutionary basis. There was an element in the city that was fired up and ready for work, but the leaders, citizens and some teachers, turned out to be simply sons of the petty bourgeoisie, swindlers, who, as soon as the uprising occurred, began to escape under various fabricated pretexts. There was no one to lead the real workers. Several more dedicated leaders, such as Tale Hristov, with a few honest workers, a total of 20-30 people, left the city, went out with a company and joined the Prilep company led by Petar Acev. Soon after they left, the army that was near the city attacked them; a fight broke out near Studenec. The company had about 87 people, and only one army patrol of 35-36 people attacked and killed them. broke up. The company was on a peak - Studenec. Instead of fighting from the top, Petar Acev suggested that they retreat. The army took their position, they remained in a lower position, were broken up, the new 30 people scattered, and many died. This frightened the citizens and no one dared to rise up in rebellion anymore. We with the company were left aimlessly wandering around the villages. At the same time, I told Dame that I had arrived and wanted to hear his opinion on the affairs there. I received his answer late. Until his answer, the news I was receiving from Bitola was announcing doom - the end. And Dame described the situation as hopeless,” notes Gjorche. 

Soon what remained of the Kostur company of Lazar Pop Trajkov and Ivan Popov joined them. Instead of retreating, Petrov proposed a new plan - to mine the railway line between Lerin and Voden with united forces and thus strike a blow at the Ottoman authorities. The plan was coordinated with Dame Gruev and other voivodes, but in the meantime the General Staff, due to the collapse of the uprising, decided to gradually disband the companies and preserve the weapons. 

On the way to Mariovo, the united companies were betrayed near the village of Chanishta and attacked by a numerous Ottoman army. After a day of fierce fighting, they managed to repel the attacks and escape unnoticed at night, inflicting significant losses on their opponents, but also suffering casualties themselves and being left without ammunition and food. Later, during a meeting with Boris Sarafov, Gjorche learned that the General Staff had already made a decision to disband the companies. 

"That same evening, news was received that the army was coming to the surrounding villages, so that same evening we headed to the top of Mount Nidze to hide and escape to the other side. Quite unexpectedly, to our great surprise, that same evening and at the same place with 14-15 people, Sarafov, who had escaped somewhere from the Kostur region, arrived. Sarafov informed me of the Headquarters' decision to disband the companies, because the uprising was failing and the companies were falling apart, so at least we could save the weapons. There was also hope for an amnesty," reports Gjorce. 

He is referring to the pardon promised by the Ottoman Turks to those rebels who would voluntarily surrender with their weapons. Gjorce, as he says at the end of this chapter, did not agree with the disbandment of the companies, but in the end, it simply had to happen.

Photo: Created by AI; taken from archives