Skopje, 31 August 2026 (MIA)

Slobodan Ivanov

"For us Macedonians, this is no time to divide ourselves into classes and parties. We must all fight together to win our basic human rights and political freedom, and finally, we must also fight for social justice. But even those who have chosen a different path should be careful not to obstruct us in this uneven ideological struggle we have undertaken for the freedom of Macedonia," Todor Aleksandrov wrote to Todor Andreev on July 31, 1924.

Todor Aleksandrov, who was assassinated on August 31 in 1924, is one of the most significant and striking figures in the Macedonian revolutionary movement and national history. It is significant, according to the memoirs of revolutionaries and other accounts, that Aleksandrov was a dedicated champion of an independent Macedonian national state and a hero of the Macedonian nation. Statements given to foreign newspapers only cemented his image before Europe and the world – as a Macedonian nationalist, or rather a national patriot, meaning a Macedonian national activist and fighter for Macedonia's independence.

"Regardless of his activities, which were not always aligned with progress, Todor Aleksandrov had a massive influence on the masses. This was likely due to his rapport with the people, his ascetic lifestyle, as was said, and other factors. However, another crucial aspect must be kept in mind: he was, after all, shaped as a revolutionary within the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, whose foundational goal was the liberation of Macedonia," General Mihajlo Apostolski, a partisan, national hero, historian, and the second president of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (MANU), once remarked.

The assassination of Todor Aleksandrov took place on August 31, 1924, near the village of Lopovo on the Pirin Mountain. He was traveling to a location where a congress of the Serres Revolutionary District of VMRO-Autonomous was scheduled to be held that day, accompanied by General Aleksandar Protogerov, the chetnik Panajot (Panzo) Zafirov, who served as Aleksandrov's bodyguard, and the voivodas Shterju Vlahov and Dincho Vretenarov. Near the village of Gorna Sushica, the group stopped for a rest, at which point Dincho Sugarski and Dincho Balkanski joined them as VMRO couriers and guides. At Vlahov's suggestion, Aleksandrov handed his rifle to Sugarski to carry. After they resumed their journey, during the next break near Lopovo, Vlahov and Vretenarov opened fire from behind at Aleksandrov, hitting him with up to four bullets, one of which struck him in the head.

The shots woke Panzo, and he tried to reach for his rifle, but at that moment, he was fatally shot by Dincho Balkanski. General Protogerov was nearby, but he was not fired upon and was left alive. Todor and Panzo died at the scene of the armed attack.

THE ACT OF THE ASSASSINATION AND DIRECT PARTICIPANTS: THE GROUP OF ALEKO PASHA AND COLONEL ATANASOV

The assassination of Todor Aleksandrov was a major turning point in the revolutionary activity and future course of the VMRO. Based on the known and available archival documents, materials, collections, monographs, memoirs, and newspapers from that era, two parts can be distinguished regarding the actual act of Aleksandrov’s assassination.

So, according to historian Prof. Dr. Nikola Zhezhov and his monograph on the assassination – "A Century-Old Secret" – the first part constructs and explains the indisputable thesis regarding the near-total accuracy of how the assassination unfolded, i.e., the confirmed participants and the execution of the planned murder. This part of the events on August 31, 1924, is completely clear and leaves almost no unknowns. The act was planned and carefully prepared over a span of several weeks – perhaps even more than a month. The facts and arguments at our disposal are unequivocal and precise. From the moment Aleksandrov affixed his signature to the May Manifesto, indirect preparations and subsequently direct preparations for his physical liquidation began. What is indisputable, precise, and accurately proven is the circle of confirmed conspirators and participants in the direct events surrounding the murder.

The number boils down to six people. The operation was led and coordinated by Aleko Vasilev-Pashata, originally from Dolna Dzhumaja, Serres region, today in Aegean Macedonia, and Colonel Georgi Atanasov, who was born in Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria. Their participation is confirmed by all records, as well as direct and indirect information. Furthermore, the second echelon in that conspiracy was made up of Shterju Vlahov, Dincho Vretenarov, Dincho Balkanski, and Dincho Sugarski, who fired upon and killed Todor Aleksandrov and his bodyguard right at the scene of the assassination. Letters sent between them, documentation, and the testimonies of eyewitnesses to the event confirm that this group of 6 people was well coordinated and had a previously and precisely determined plan for the murder of Todor Aleksandrov.

Evidence that Aleko Pashata had plans against Aleksandrov is also shown by a meeting with Georgi Zankov on July 13, 1924, in Sofia, during which the voivoda of the Serres Revolutionary District of VMRO was very direct in the conversation.

"Keep quiet until the congress, where we will bring Todor to his senses, or, alternatively, we won't elect him. However, we are determined to rid ourselves of his arbitrary actions for which, if he does not renounce them, something else might befall him as well," Pashata said.

However, it seems that Aleko Pashata primarily had personal motives for his hostility toward Aleksandrov. Namely, he was aware of Todor's intentions at the upcoming congress in the Serres region to put on trial allegations regarding Pashata's excessive spending of money from the organization's treasury and, in that sense, his evidently rapid enrichment, as well as the punishment for potential embezzlement. By all accounts, Pashata by no means wanted Aleksandrov to arrive at the scheduled congress, so he joined the conspiracy a few weeks prior.

The case of Colonel Georgi Atanasov is seemingly more mysterious, according to Zhezhov. He somehow remained in the background compared to Pashata, but Atanasov's connections with Bulgarian officer circles should by no means be underestimated. This should come as no surprise since Atanasov held a military rank in the Bulgarian army. Atanasov's connections and friendship with military circles date back to the time of the communist September Uprising in Bulgaria in 1923. Proof of this is Atanasov's letter to Lieutenant Dimitar Radev dated September 29, 1923, in which Atanasov expresses support for the Bulgarian authorities and speaks very clearly about his connections with Bulgarian officers – mentioning names and surnames – even though VMRO was also interested in cooperation with the Bulgarian army at that time. All in all, it was precisely then that Atanasov built strong ties with the officers, which may have later served him in the preparations for the liquidation of Todor Aleksandrov.

The mentioning of specific names of Bulgarian officers indicates that Atanasov, through those already established firm and close ties, also wanted to cement his place within VMRO. That officer connection also allowed him to oppose Aleksandrov when, similar to the case with Aleko Pashata, accusations grew increasingly louder against Atanasov as well regarding involvement in arbitrariness, corruption, and embezzlement of the Organization's funds. Nevertheless, according to Zhezhov, Aleksandrov was aware of such information, yet he still insisted on maintaining good relations with Atanasov, and there is a high probability that he was also verifying the truthfulness of these findings and allegations.

From left to right: Colonel Georgi Atanasov, Aleksandar Protogerov and Aleksandar (Aleko) Vasilev-Pashata

Whether Todor Aleksandrov knew about these specific "officer connections" of Georgi Atanasov – with names and surnames – cannot be claimed with certainty. Prof. Zhezhov points out that the only certain thing is that Aleksandrov knew that, due to his military rank in the Bulgarian army, Atanasov had contacts with military personnel. However, this should not have come as a surprise to Aleksandrov, who, logically, would want to utilize them for the benefit of VMRO. The correspondence between Aleksandrov and Atanasov proceeded normally, and nothing indicated a potential breach of trust between them. Therefore, there was no major suspicion on Aleksandrov's part regarding Atanasov's potential involvement in a conspiracy against him.

However, Georgi Atanasov also had other personal motives to act against Todor Aleksandrov. At that time, the colonel had asked for the hand in marriage of the sister of his superior in VMRO – Koca Aleksandrova – and everything would have ended in the best possible order if he had not immediately afterward requested money from the Aleksandrov family for business purposes, which was refused. Consequently, the engagement between Atanasov and Koca was called off. That event had a strong impact on Atanasov, who, following the incident, tried in every possible way to take revenge on Todor because, by the act of canceling the engagement, Zhezhov believes, Atanasov's personal vanity was wounded.

PROTOGEROV AND MIHAJLOV

In the second part of the reconstruction of the event, it is possible to determine, with partial accuracy, taking into account the available data and the utilized archival documentation, the course of actions and everything that preceded the assassination, as well as what followed later.

Most of the indisputable facts also point to a certain involvement of General Aleksandar Protogerov in the indirect plans to remove Aleksandrov from his leadership position in the Central Committee of the VMRO. Protogerov was a witness to Aleksandrov's murder, but the conspirators left him alive and did not shoot him, which is proof of his connection to them of some sort. Naturally, in the final months before the murder, Protogerov was on bad terms with Aleksandrov, and data indicates that he was interested in his replacement within the CC of VMRO. Furthermore, Protogerov's connections with the Bulgarian Military-Officer League have also been confirmed; the League openly stated that it desired the murder of Aleksandrov, which also makes the general an accomplice – though, according to documents, only indirectly, Zhezhov emphasizes.

However, there is no written proof, oral testimony, or any collateral document indicating that Protogerov ordered the liquidation of his CC colleague, Aleksandrov. As with everything else, more solid and firm indicators, findings, and evidence are needed here as well.

"It is an interesting fact that, despite the documented explanation of Protogerov's participation in Aleksandrov's murder, the Seventh Congress in 1928 adopted a resolution 'to seek out and punish the culprits for Todor's murder in the future as well.' (The VMRO-Mihajlovist faction killed Protogerov two weeks before the Seventh Congress, ed.) In accordance with this resolution, it is concluded that the new leadership of VMRO would continue to punish any newly 'surviving participants' in the plans to assassinate Todor Aleksandrov. In fact, even after that VMRO Congress, the issue of punishing the culprits for Aleksandrov's murder was not fully closed. The issue of the murder of Todor Aleksandrov continued to be very important for VMRO, especially for Vancho Mihajlov, who brought up this burning issue whenever he had plans to reckon with his opponents within the Organization. Of course, a big question mark remains – whether there were already true suspected members of the Organization on the list who had any kind of connection to the event of August 31, 1924. Nearly 4 years had passed since the murder of Todor Aleksandrov, and much relevant evidence had been deliberately destroyed by the true conspirators. Some of the evidence, if not destroyed, was carefully guarded from the public eye. Todor Aleksandrov is the key figure in VMRO, and the discovery of such documentation could have caused tectonic shifts both within the hierarchy of the Organization itself and among the numerous Macedonian organizations in Bulgaria," writes Prof. Zhezhov.

So, with a certain degree of accuracy, one can partially explain the non-participation of Ivan (Vancho) Mihajlov in the plans for Todor Aleksandrov's murder, but there is no doubt that Vancho utilized the assassination afterward for the physical elimination of rivals and anyone he considered a threat to his career and his pursuit of unlimited power and a cult of personality as the sole, undisputed, and untouchable ruler within VMRO-Terrorist. Despite (subsequent) intelligence allegations, as well as independent testimonies linking Vancho to the assassination of Aleksandrov, according to Zhezhov's research, there are no primary or secondary historical sources that would confirm Mihajlov had any participation in the event of August 31, 1924.

"It is true that Mihajlov used some of the information from VMRO's investigative actions to reckon with some of his dissidents under the accusation of participating in the planning of Todor Aleksandrov's murder, but we have not come across relevant data showing that he participated in the tragic event," says Prof. Zhezhov.

"As one of the indirect pieces of evidence that Vancho Mihajlov did not agree with Aleksandrov can also be the testimony of Stojan Negovanski, who emphasizes in his memoirs that Mihajlov also cooperated with military circles. According to Negovanski, Vancho, as Todor Aleksandrov's secretary, photographed all of his correspondence and took it to the military personnel. Why Vancho Mihajlov would take all the documentation for inspection by the military-officer circles can only be surmised, but if this testimony is true, then it can be confirmed with certainty that the Bulgarian officer corps knew all the confidential matters within VMRO. In this way, Vancho Mihajlov built strong ties with the Military-Officer League in Bulgaria," Zhezhov clarifies.

The historian also highlights Vancho's closeness with Ivan V'lkov – the Minister of War of Bulgaria – which Protogerov was also aware of, as a factor of open suspicion regarding Mihajlov’s involvement or his indirect role in the conspiracy against Aleksandrov.

USSR, COMINTERN, AND BULGARIAN-MACEDONIAN COMMUNISTS

"As long as I am at the head of the Organization, it will fight in every possible way against communism, which I personally consider extremely harmful to the Macedonian national movement," stated Todor Aleksandrov. This stance was published around the time the assassination took place, in an article in the British newspaper “The Times," which had also reported similar statements by "Aleksandrov of Macedonia" several months earlier.

In this part of the scholarly account of Todor Aleksandrov’s assassination—where the events can be partially corroborated—the unequivocal stance of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), the Comintern, and the USSR stands out; they openly called for the removal of this Central Committee member from his leadership position within VMRO and, through their proclamations, letters, and reports, even fostered an atmosphere conducive to his physical liquidation. "Communist elements made no secret of their interest in taking over VMRO from within, a goal that could only be achieved through the murder—or physical liquidation—of Todor Aleksandrov. This makes the communist factions—coordinated by the Soviet government in Moscow and the communist center in Vienna—the 'intellectual assassins' of Todor Aleksandrov. This thesis is corroborated by documents from communist parties found in archives in Moscow, Vienna, and Sofia. However, there is no available primary, secondary, or tertiary historical source stating that these various communist elements directly participated in planning and carrying out the assassination of Todor Aleksandrov," Zhezhov explained.

The historian notes that although Aleksandrov was a staunch anti-communist with right-wing political views. In 1923 he took the first steps toward rapprochement with the USSR, the Comintern, and Macedonian and Balkan communists. Dimitar Vlahov, whom Aleksandrov appointed as the VMRO negotiator with the Soviets, recounts the words of the Organization's leader. Specifically, according to Vlahov, Aleksandrov stated that he was "not against the communists but rather in favor of an independent Macedonia," and that he wanted Soviet Russia to support the Macedonian movement for an independent and united Macedonia.

At that moment, according to Zhezhov, Aleksandrov placed an unusually unreserved trust in Vlahov. Evidence of this is the high honor bestowed upon Vlahov—a VMRO badge personally signed by his longtime friend and close associate.

On May 6, 1924, Aleksandrov authorized the other two Central Committee members—Aleksandar Protogerov and Petar Chaulev—to sign the May Manifesto on his behalf; the document, addressing "Macedonian brothers," clearly spoke of an independent and sovereign Macedonian state and a distinct Macedonian people. Aleksandrov requested and insisted that Vlahov and the other partners in the process refrain from publishing the Manifesto until the conditions were ripe. He believed that premature publication would jeopardize both his personal safety and the fate of VMRO.

However, the historical record indicates that the Soviets, the Comintern, and the Balkan Communist Federation (BCF) harbored a covert agenda: to take over VMRO from within. Vlahov played a pivotal role in this, acting in accordance with Comintern policy. Communists and leftists simply did not view Aleksandrov as one of their own. It was at this point, Zhezhov notes, that political maneuvering began to oust the right-winger—the "leader" of VMRO—with the help of leftist members such as Todor Panica (a federalist) and Konstantin Jankov (a communist of Macedonian descent who was not a VMRO member), Dimo Hadzhi Dimov, as well as politically indifferent opportunists like Aleko Pashata or Colonel Atanasov, who viewed the rapprochement with the Left merely as a means to gain an advantage for something else.

According to Jankov's reports, Aleksandrov sought to avoid severing ties with the Bulgarian right-wing government of Aleksandar Tsankov; for the Communists, this political stance meant that Aleksandrov had to be removed from VMRO.

Thus, just one week after the signing of the Manifesto, Georgi Dimitrov convened the Presidium of the BKF, and the Communists began rapidly withdrawing their support for Aleksandrov while also working to discredit him. Consequently, the leader of VMRO was declared unfit.

Aleksandrov was aware of the plans to publish the May Manifesto and did everything in his power to prevent it. To this end, he engaged in correspondence and held personal meetings with the Macedonian Konstantin Jankov—a member of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party—while also maintaining contact with other communists. Nevertheless, he did not succeed; Dimitar Vlahov, the USSR, and the Comintern published the Manifesto in late July.

Here, the objective historian noted that the leftist Jankov grasped the sincere intention of the rightist Aleksandrov, and so both genuinely engaged in the talks between the Autonomist VMRO and the BCP that summer, aiming to reach an agreement—for the benefit of the Macedonian revolutionary cause. However, other factors did not want such an agreement.

It is important to note that in a report from October of that same year, 1924, the BCP acknowledged the mistake regarding the decision to prematurely publish the May Manifesto.

The hasty publication of the Manifesto, following the directives and actions of Dimitar Vlahov, was the direct cause of Aleksandrov's assassination. However, just as the trial in Italy against Dimitar Stefanov—Petar Chaulev’s assassin—indicated only Chaulev’s "indirect involvement" in the assassination of Aleksandrov, historiography to date has labeled Vlahov and the leftist-communist groups merely as the "moral instigators" behind the killing of the then-most prominent VMRO leader, without identifying a specific person among those factions who ordered, participated in, or organized the assassination.

BULGARIAN MILITARY OFFICERS' LEAGUE

"The work of VMRO must be carried out within Macedonia—on Macedonian soil—and must preserve its independence. It must remain free from any outside influence. VMRO should not exist on Bulgarian territory," writes Gjorgji Pop Hristov, Aleksandrov’s successor in the VMRO Central Committee, in his “Memoirs”.

Next to consider is the role of Bulgaria’s Military League and the government of Aleksandar Tsankov in the plans to assassinate Todor Aleksandrov. It is an indisputable fact that Bulgarian officers and individuals close to the Bulgarian authorities assisted those directly involved in the assassination. However, the exact identities of the members of the military group remain unknown, and various hypotheses exist regarding this matter. A significant body of documentary evidence indicates that a specific group of Bulgarian officers openly advocated for the violent removal of Aleksandrov from his leadership position within VMRO’s Central Committee. The primary motive for such behavior on the part of the Bulgarian military personnel was VMRO's new policy regarding the Macedonian question and the fact that Aleksandrov—albeit indirectly—had affixed his signature to the contents of the May Manifesto.

- Todor Aleksandrov became an obstacle to the realization of Bulgarian national and state strategies regarding Macedonia, as well as to the Bulgarian officer corps—Zhezhov would emphasize.

Bulgarian Prime Minister Aleksandar Tsankov himself, along with other government officials, was interested in seeing Aleksandrov removed from the leadership of VMRO; they made no secret of these views, openly expressing them—or documenting them in writing—shortly before his assassination. In this context, the verbal hostility between Aleksandrov and the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior, Ivan Rusev—one of Tsankov’s closest associates—is also frequently cited. The name of Hristo Kalfov—the Minister of Foreign Affairs and another of Tsankov’s close associates—also figures in this picture; he engaged in public clashes with VMRO and Aleksandrov, as did other members of the government. Regarding the Bulgarian government of Tsankov being identified as the primary instigator behind the removal (or assassination) of Aleksandrov, one must also consider the attitude of the Military Officers' League toward VMRO; while largely favorable, there were nonetheless occasional "stumbling blocks."

Macedonian-Canadian historian Andrew Rossos believes that the aforementioned close associate of Vancho Mihajlov—Bulgarian Minister of War and intelligence officer Ivan Valkov—was the "mastermind behind the operation" to assassinate Aleksandrov, with the backing of Tsankov. Valkov himself later identified Rusev as the man who sealed Aleksandrov's fate.

- Such attitudes held by the Bulgarian officer corps and the Bulgarian government fostered significant discontent regarding Todor Aleksandrov among a segment of the Bulgarian socio-political public. Furthermore, some documentation reveals that certain Bulgarian officers and government officials knew and met with the individuals who directly assassinated Aleksandrov—a fact indicating that state and political figures had an interest in the successful outcome of the plot of August 31, 1924. This makes the Bulgarian government of Aleksandar Tsankov nothing less than an accomplice in the plans to assassinate the prominent member of the VMRO Central Committee, Prof. Zhezhov emphasized.

The British Foreign Office captures the overall situation in Bulgaria during the government of Aleksandar Stamboliyski and the period that followed. One diplomatic report states:

"The power of the Organization is indisputable; proof of this is the death of Mr. Stamboliyski, the only post-war Bulgarian prime minister who dared to work towards rapprochement with Yugoslavia. It is certain that the Organization’s influence on the current Bulgarian government is immense. VMRO is waging an inevitable war against Serbian rule in Southern Serbia through terror and violence, and the Bulgarian government is powerless to stop it."

"Such stances and methods of struggle on the part of VMRO and Todor Aleksandrov fostered a conviction within the Bulgarian government that the Central Committee member needed to be eliminated from the VMRO leadership," Zhezhov explained.

Although, as we saw above, the Comintern and the BCF criticized Aleksandrov for not yet severing ties with Tsankov and the right-wing Bulgarian government, those relations were already strained to the breaking point by July 1924.

"It is better for the VMRO seal to be hung on a beech tree in Macedonia than to sit on any table in Sofia," Aleksandrov stated on July 13, in the presence of friends and fellow fighters.

The VMRO Central Committee member was, in fact, attempting to demonstrate his anti-communist stance to Bulgarian government officials. Todor Aleksandrov found himself caught between two fires: his contacts with the Communists and the Comintern and the Bulgarian state's policy regarding Macedonia. Following a meeting held on July 28, 1924, between members of the Central Committee and the Bulgarian minister Dimo ​​Kazasov, the latter recorded Aleksandrov’s explanation in his notes.

"It is true—we negotiated with the federalists and the communists, reached an agreement with them, and signed the joint manifesto. For us, that agreement was not an end in itself but a means to draw European public opinion to the Macedonian issue. Since England and France are sensitive and wary regarding every move Russia makes in the Balkans, we knew that an agreement between us and the communists would strike a nerve, causing them to turn their attention toward us—toward Macedonia, Bulgaria, and the Organization. And we were not mistaken. They are alarmed by our agreement. We have achieved our goal. We no longer need the agreement," said Aleksandrov.

On July 30, during a conversation between Aleksandrov and Angel Uzunov—a native of Ohrid—Todor said something else. Uzunov conveys Aleksandrov's words:

- I gave him good news... For him and the friends who sent him. Our history with the Bolsheviks scared them, but that’s a good thing... Let them take that as a lesson to remember.

All in all, following the May Manifesto, Bulgarian authorities and military circles were the most interested in eliminating Aleksandrov. The implication of at least three of Tsankov’s ministers in the alleged plot is a clear indicator, but this picture is further rounded out by the conduct of subsequent Bulgarian governments and the fact that, for instance, Prime Minister Georgi Kyoseivanov banned the commemoration of Aleksandrov’s life and work—as well as visits to his grave—during the 1930s.

- The Bulgarian authorities in Macedonia and among the Macedonians sought by every means to extinguish the memory of VMRO and Todor Aleksandrov. Aleksandrov’s image was no longer useful to the authorities in Sofia, as it reminded the Macedonian people that the late member of the VMRO Central Committee had built his authority and standing among the majority of Macedonians on the clear platform that the Organization’s primary goal was the creation of a separate Macedonian state. Such a memory of Todor Aleksandrov was no longer needed, and the Bulgarian authorities therefore attempted, through various measures, to consign him to historical oblivion. Even in death, Todor Aleksandrov did not fit into the Bulgarian state's strategic plans regarding Macedonia and the Macedonian issue. Despite everything, Todor Aleksandrov’s popularity among the majority of Macedonians remained immense, and his name continued to be invoked within the ranks of the now-disbanded VMRO. The VMRO motto—"Freedom or Death"—was supplemented by the sentiment: "Todor Aleksandrov is dead; long live the Todor Aleksandrovs," notes Zhezhov.

The Organization swiftly executed those directly involved in the planning and assassination of Todor Aleksandrov. Individuals whom the new VMRO leadership deemed the organizers and instigators of the murder were also apprehended and punished. VMRO identified and singled out Aleko Pashata, Georgi Atanasov, and their associates in this regard; later, in 1928, charges of involvement in the conspiracy were also brought against another Central Committee member, Aleksandar Protogerov, who was subsequently assassinated by VMRO operatives.

- However, despite all these confirmed hypotheses and opinions based on scientific research and available data, historical scholarship still cannot determine with absolute certainty who ordered the assassination of Todor Aleksandrov. This remains one of the final mysteries surrounding the tragic event that altered the historical trajectory of VMRO. Perhaps that secret document exists somewhere—in an as-yet-unopened archival collection or a private repository of historical records—waiting to be discovered by the inquisitive eye of a historian. Until then, the identity of the person who truly ordered the assassination of Todor Aleksandrov will remain one of the greatest mysteries in the history of VMRO, concluded Prof. Zhezhov.

Scholarly research relies on archival documentation as well as published and unpublished historical sources; yet, to date, not a single primary record or document has been found that would confirm or prove the identity of the person who commissioned, ordered, or authorized the assassination of Todor Aleksandrov.

Photo: Archives